ROD NORDLAND; MARK MAZZETTI
International Herald Tribune
08-25-2010
Graft inquiry shows fragile U.S. position with Karzai
Byline: ROD NORDLAND; MARK MAZZETTI
Section: SPECIAL REPORT
Type: News
What's the best way to quash corruption in Afghanistan without alienating the country's leader? Americans are in a bind
As corruption investigations begin to focus on President Hamid Karzai's inner circle, an Afghan official has pinned blame for endemic corruption in Afghanistan on
foreign contractors, which he said had created an "economic mafia" in the war-torn country.
What started as the arrest of a little-known Karzai aide has become a significant test of U.S. efforts to root out corruption in Afghanistan, even as it tries not to alienate the Karzai government. The two goals are coming into conflict at a time when American popular support for the war is eroding and frustration in the U.S. Congress about the Karzai government is rising.
The investigations that led to the arrest last month of the aide, Mohammed Zia Saleh, a member of Afghanistan's National Security Council, are being carried out by Afghan investigators who are strongly backed by the United States. Mr. Karzai admitted Sunday that he had personally intervened to secure the release of the aide and said he would impose
new rules governing the investigators.
Some U.S. officials and outside experts warned that the escalating tensions between Washington and Kabul could undermine the overall American strategy in Afghanistan, aimed at combating Taliban militias and strengthening government institutions before a planned U.S. military withdrawal begins next summer.
"The administration is engaged in a delicate balancing act in Afghanistan in which the principal objective is stability," said David Rothkopf, a national security specialist who worked in the administration of President Bill Clinton. "There are a couple of things they need for stability: One is government institutions that people trust and don't want to overthrow. And the other is government institutions that are strong enough politically to survive.
"And the calculation here is that you need Karzai for the latter and you need anti-corruption for the former," Mr. Rothkopf said, "The problem is that Karzai is too associated with corruption, so if the anti-corruption efforts are too vigorous, they will lead to undermining this ally."
At a news conference on Monday, Waheed Omar, Mr. Karzai's spokesman, elaborated on criticisms that the Afghan president made Sunday during an interview with ABC News and blamed
foreign contractors spending Western reconstruction money for much of Afghanistan's corruption. He said that the
new government rules would rein in the two U.S.-backed anti-corruption agencies, the Major Crimes Task Force and the Sensitive Investigative Unit.
By the end of the day, however, the presidential palace had not issued the decree.
U.S. government officials said they were not sure what to make of the statements by Mr. Karzai and the spokesman.
"It's perfectly understandable that as these
new tools develop, the Afghan government needs to ensure that they are functioning under the rule of law and the Afghan Constitution," said P.J. Crowley, a U.S. State Department spokesman. "But going forward, these entities must be able to open investigations and aggressively pursue facts wherever they may lead without looking over their shoulders."
The administration of President Barack Obama has made fighting corruption in Afghanistan a mainstay of its policy, and the two
new agencies have been particularly successful in apprehending corruption suspects, with at least 52 people now in custody on graft and drug trafficking charges.
Despite widespread allegations of corruption involving President Karzai's relatives, including his half brother Ahmed Wali Karzai, investigators have not taken action against any family members. The perception that the president intended to scuttle the two agencies has caused one of the most serious crises in U.S.-Afghan relations since the presidential elections last year, which international observers denounced as fraudulent.
The two anti-corruption agencies have broad powers to arrest, detain and try suspects, and both have large components of U.S. advisers.
"There will be no political interference, but we don't want anyone taken out of their homes with chains and shackles," Mr. Omar said, describing Mr. Karzai's promised
new rules. The rules, he said, would ensure that "neither Afghanistan's government nor the international community will interfere in their work, which will be based on Afghanistan's Constitution and judicial sovereignty."
Some law enforcement officials suggested that Afghan officials may simply be unfamiliar with routine law-enforcement techniques now being used by the elite anti-corruption units.
The current turbulence traces back to the spring of 2009, when the U.S. Justice Department began several major initiatives to help build up the Afghan government's anti-corruption and counternarcotics law enforcement efforts, as well as an independent judiciary. To protect them from political interference, the two anti- corruption task forces have their own lawyers, investigators and judges.
In an interview on Monday, Drug Enforcement Administration officials praised the growing capabilities of the Sensitive Investigative Unit, which consists of dozens of Afghan police officers overseen by an Afghan police colonel.
The D.E.A. vetted the officers and brought them to Quantico, Virginia, for a six-week training course. Veteran D.E.A. agents, serving as advisers, work with them in Afghanistan.
"We don't just train them and then never see them again," said Frankie Shroyer, the deputy chief of operations for the D.E.A. Still, the degree of involvement by U.S. officials in the work of the Afghan units is a matter of acute diplomatic sensitivity. D.E.A. officials emphasized that the relationship is a partnership with the Afghan government, and that Afghan officials direct all counternarcotics police activities.
"Everything is done in conjunction with Afghan counterparts," said Thomas M. Harrigan, the D.E.A.'s chief of operations.
Some U.S. officials acknowledged the administration's concern about Mr. Karzai's seeming defiance of anti-corruption inquiries, but also the limits to what the United States can do.
Earlier this year, the United States adopted a
new strategy in dealing with the Karzai government. Instead of continuing to regularly accuse the Afghan government of failing to root out corruption, the Obama administration decided to back off and publicly praise Mr. Karzai and his aides.
Still, some experts said that the previous "tough love" strategy had fostered paranoia inside the presidential palace in Kabul, leading Mr. Karzai to conclude that the United States was trying to push him out. "We had a year and a half making Karzai convinced that he has to tighten ties with these corrupt people in order to survive," said Ronald E. Neumann, the U.S. ambassador to Kabul from 2005 to 2007.
Mr. Neumann said that the July 2011 date for the beginning of a military withdrawal from Afghanistan has only reinforced Mr. Karzai's belief that he must cut deals with unsavory but powerful figures to remain in charge after the Americans leave.
"You can't ignore the corruption, but you can't ignore the fact that Karzai sees some of it as vital to his survival," he said.
Copyright International Herald Tribune Aug 25, 2010
